(Article from Insurance Law Alert, December 2022)
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A South Carolina appellate court ruled that an intentional acts exclusion barred coverage for injuries arising out of a physical altercation, regardless of whether the insured party intended to cause harm to the victim. South Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v. Longphre, 2022 WL 17484348 (S.C. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2022).
An individual injured in a physical altercation argued that Farm Bureau, which insured the other individual in the fight, was required to provide coverage for his injuries. Farm Bureau denied coverage based on an intentional acts exclusion. The court explained that the exclusion applied because the record indicated that the insured intentionally pushed the injured party. The court deemed it irrelevant that the record also contained evidence that the insured did not intend to cause injury, explaining that coverage is excluded for unexpected results of intentional acts. In granting Farm Bureau’s summary judgment motion, the court noted that the underlying complaint’s couching of the incident in terms of negligence did not create a genuine issue of material fact where, as here, the factual record indicates unequivocal intentional conduct.
In contrast, a New York appellate court affirmed a trial court decision denying an insurer’s summary judgment motion regarding its duty to defend and indemnify claims arising out of a physical altercation. Vermont Mutual Ins. Group v. LePore, 2022 WL 17490490 (N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 8, 2022).
LePore was sued by Cole for injuries Cole sustained while trying to diffuse an altercation between LePore and another party. LePore sought coverage under a homeowners’ policy which excluded coverage for bodily injury “[w]hich is expected or intended” by an insured. The insurer denied coverage, arguing that there was no “occurrence” under the policy and that an intentional acts exclusion applied.
The court held that the insurer failed to meet the “heavy burden” required to be relieved of its duty to defend on a summary judgment motion, emphasizing that there must be “no possible factual or legal basis upon which the insurer may eventually be held obligated to indemnify the insured under any policy provision.” The court explained that the bill of particulars indicated that LePore negligently and carelessly struck Cole while she was trying to stop the altercation, that Cole was inadvertently hit by LePore, and that LePore did not intend to injure Cole. The court held that these allegations gave rise to the possibility that Cole’s injuries resulted from LePore’s unintentional conduct. The court noted that while “the record contains evidence suggesting that the incident at issue was an intentional tort, ‘the pleadings can be read as alleging that [Cole’s] injuries were negligently inflicted by [LePore].’”
The court noted that an insured may be entitled to coverage for an intentional act that causes an unintended injury, and explained that in evaluating whether coverage exists, a court typically looks to the point of view of the insured to determine whether a result was unexpected. Finally, the court held that the doctrine of transferred intent (under which a defendant may be held responsible for unintentionally harming an individual if the defendant intended to harm a different individual) was inapplicable because it applies to a tort analysis rather than an insurer’s duties pursuant to a contract.